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Abstract—Due to the rapid increment of the cyber attacks,
intrusion detection system (IDS) is shifting towards collabora-
tive approaches. There is a huge demand for securing larger
networking environments for providing a safeguard against
threats. In order to optimize the feasible detection performance,
Collaborative Intrusion Detection Networks (CIDN) approaches
have been adopted in practical scenarios, which enables a
group of IDS nodes to mutually share and exchange mandatory
information with each other, for example, IDS-signatures, attacks
alarms. However, CIDN networks are distributed in nature,
such networks still face plenty of implementation problems,
especially, insider intruder can easily dominate any of security
node and leave the entire security system vulnerable. To achieve
the trust-based communication between each of IDS node, the
recent advancement in blockchain applications is considered
as a good fit to create trust-based communication in CIDN
networks. This work converges CIDN network and blockchain in
SDN context. Firstly, we investigated existing related work and
highlighted challenges and research gap towards blockchain in
CIDN networks. Secondly, we utilised three collaborated Snort
IDS to receive the latest signature update from Ryu and then to
securely share such signatures updates to all other Snort nodes
within test-bed. Our work is motivated to detect seven types of
common attacks with collaborated signature-based IDS, which
feasibly processes more packets to achieve satisfactory detection
results. Overall the evaluation results show that with the adoption
of blockchain protocols, the proposed CIDN network achieves
96% of TP rate detection rate for TCP, UDP and ICMP packets.
Index Terms—Software Defined Networks, Open vSwitch,
Snort, Blockchain, , Collaborative Intrusion Detection Networks
(CIDN).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Software Defined Networking (SDN) environment, build-
ing a customised network architecture is a game changer,
where, we can flexibly transfer legacy network infrastructure to
an innovative, open source and programmable infrastructure.
The authors of [1] depicted that most of the current public
and private networks are exponentially increasing due to
our busy online life, where network complexities and issues
are also arising during implementation. With a significant
increment of cyber attackers, most of the single IDS detection
applications have failed to accurately discover attacks in large
networks, IDS collect limited information about attacks when
these are deployed against heavy traffic [2]. Most of the
legacy IDS based implementations could easily be bypassed
by complex attacks such as Denial of Services (DoS), Slowris
and by highly experienced cybercriminals. To maximise the
performance pragmatically, Collaborative intrusion Detection
Networks(CIDN) have been deployed, in which group of IDSs
collectively achieve the huge amount of data from other nodes
[3]. Although, IDS nodes are capable to share their signature-
rules with each deployed nodes of the system, in order to
improve detection efficiency and reducing false alarms [4], [5],
[6]. However, such IDS deployment can become vulnerable for
insider attack, due to the fact of interconnected and distributed
nature. If any of that node is severely infected then it can
lower down the detection performance at other nodes [7]. To
deal with this issue, there is significant demand to create an
effective security mechanism to provide potential safeguard to
signature sharing rules within CIDN networks.
With the motivation of impact and adoption of Bitcoin,
blockchain technologies and IDS based security systems are
being widely attracted towards industries and academia, this
system enables trusted individuals to easily connect other
potential network entities with verifiable approach without
the interception of any complex centralised application [8].
By utilising consensus approaches, the blockchain helps to
provide transparent and protected data storage, in which the
majority of stored data blocks can not be modified unless
to update all sub-blocks. This approach in the blockchain
is significantly required to share IDS signature rules in a
protected way for various CIDN platforms.
From the recent development of blockchain applications,
we are motivated to propose a collaborated signature-based
IDS model, which implies blockchain application to securely
share Snort signature rules with all integrated Snort nodes.
Our work mainly focuses to apply blockchain for deploying
a trusted Snort signature database with the help of SDN
Ryu [9]. This idea ensures verified signature rules from the
relevant domain, which enables collaborative CIDN to improve
detection accuracy with heavy and unknown malicious traffic,
this also helps to lower down manipulation and management
efforts. Major contributions of our work are provided below:978-1-7281-2741-5/19/$31.00 ©2019 IEEE
• To process more packets with collaborative Snort nodes
for the purpose of higher detection accuracy in seven
major attacks types.
• To create a trusted Snort signature rules sharing channel
in Ryu and reducing HIDS influencing burden in CIDN.
We utilised blockchain implementation with distributed
Snort IDSs in SDN context, SDN Ryu controller only
updates NIDS Snort signature rule then all integrated
HIDS Snort nodes are automatically updated by the
trusted channel of blockchain.
• For evaluation, we carried out two different experiments,
in the first experiment, we investigated the performance
of the proposed system with IDS based attack detection.
In the second, experiment, we investigated the proposed
system accuracy with packet-drop and packet-processing
with various input traffic intensity by using Ryu and Snort
integration in a virtual machine.
The rest of this paper is organised as: Section II introduces
the background and related work. The Section III depicts main
implementation and design. Section IV evaluates proposed
model results. Finally, we conclude our work in Section V
with future directions.
II. BACKGROUND RELATED WORK
In legacy networks, stand-alone IDS carries less information
for implemented networks, where it tries to provide a potential
safeguard against unknown malicious activities, this enables
the system to become vulnerable for potential attackers. For
example, a cyber attacker can initiate a complex attack like
Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS) to compromise a single
Intrusion Detection System (IDS), due to the fact that it is less
able to acquire overall network traffic status. To resolve this
IDS issue, there is an alarming need to provide a collaborative
IDS based solution to optimize detection ability [3].
The existing literature widely represents distributed moni-
toring based work for decades. Some of the existing systems
such as Distributed Intrusion Detection System (DIDS) [10],
which was proposed in late 1991, this system was capa-
ble to monitor distributed heterogeneous computer networks.
Addition to this, Event Monitoring Enabling Responses to
Anomalous Live Disturbances (EMERALD) [11] was also
proposed in 1991, this system was capable to record various
intrusion activities within an abstract layer of a big network.
This model was able to merge high volume events from legacy
distributed IDS.
1) Collaborative intrusion detection (CIDN): For feasible
detection performance, a CIDN system utilises IDS nodes to
share its mandatory information to every collaborated node.
The authors of [12] in 2006 discussed that each IDS node
centrally dependant in CIDN networks. For motivation of this
issue, they designed new CIDN systems based on decentralised
locations and routing infrastructure. Moreover, their system
assumes a trust-based peer system, which could easily be tar-
geted by inside intruders. In collaborative intrusion detection
systems, attacks from inside can easily create the biggest loss,
from which point an intruder can easily consume resources
and become dominant in that system.
In order to provide a safeguard against inside attackers, a
CIDN system more likely requires an appropriate and feasible
trust-based solution, in which each IDS nodes can ensure trust
factors to improve reputation amongst all IDSs. The authors
of [13] proposed an IDSs system, which was created on the
basis of the P2P overlay. The trust-aware engine is utilised to
correlate triggers and addition to this it also correlates adaptive
scheme for IDS trust management. Similarly, the authors of
[14] designed a game theory model for analysing the processes
of P2P network reporting. They investigated that if system
reputation is not compatible then a number of system peers
nodes results in false malicious reporting.
Based on the aforementioned facts, the other authors of
[15] also depicted CIDN model, in which IDS nodes trust-
worthiness is dependant on received answers, firstly they
depicted a Host-based IDS (HIDS) framework, where each
HIDS node achieve trustworthiness following by its CIDN
experience. To improve this model effectiveness, the authors
in [16] have differentiated that various IDSs may vary for
detection purpose.
2) Blockchain based IDS: Most of the industries and many
researchers are focusing to deploy blockchains based applica-
tions since last six years, most of these applications are utilised
for specific use-cases with unique and specific blockchains
requirements with unique and customised characteristics. For
example, in existing literature, there are large number of cases,
which are developed on the bases of improving privacy with
different parties in the system, the major aim was to focus for
storing data completely private [17]. Similarly, more imple-
mentations use identity schemes with cryptography applica-
tion, this mechanism caters full unavailability and anonymity
between different transactions [16]. Based on these versatile
approaches, most industries and researchers have been trying
to investigate blockchain based application potential.
The blockchain based technologies are widely used to
store information in a decentralised way to provide safeguard
against any deviations. It is also very vital to find out the
feasible way how to deploy the blockchain system in intrusion
detection systems. Most of the current research is investigating
this gap, the authors of [18], have provided a blockchain based
CIDN framework, in this method, set of false alarms from
IDSs are considered as blockchain transactions. Then, most of
collaborating IDSs nodes utilised unique communication pro-
tocol for stable transaction connection before generating them
in a specific block. This approach can be used as a safeguard
against intrusion in blockchains. However, the authors did not
provide a systematic implementation in detail, addition to this
they did not evaluate results with practical implementation.
To deal with this issue, authors in [19] utilised some early
insights based on the interception of IDSs and blockchains
units, they also addressed some issues and challenges in this
platform. According to the authors, blockchains can provide
a positive impact on a distributed intrusion detection system
with regard to data sharing, exchange of alarms and trust
based processing. Similarly, authors of [20] also introduced
a CIoTA framework to utilised the blockchain mechanism
for collaborative anomaly detection, but there were limited
resources. Moreover, IDS agents can also help to protect
blockchain applications.
In contrast, there are some works , which have been pub-
lished with OpenFlow based protocol, such as authors of [21]
discussed a ChainGuard, which is developed on OpenFlow
based firewall, this approach is feasibly created for securing
SDN based blockchains system. In this method, OpenFlow
based switch traffic is propagated to the blockchain based
ChainGuard node. The main purpose of this system is to lower
down the unknown malicious activities from participating
system nodes. Moreover, the authors of [22] also developed
an effective DistBlockNet system, also known as SDN based
distributed system for IoT security, in which blockchains were
utilised as key elements. This mechanism enables other nodes
interaction without the interception of any trust-based central
controller.
III. DESIGN OF SNORT BASED CIDN NETWORK WITH
BLOCKCHAIN
In this section, we depict major SDN based deployment and
implementation. Our proposed model comprises blockchain
based collaborative intrusion detection network, which uses
Snort IDS as Host-based (HIDS) and Network-based (NIDS)
with Ryu programmable flexibility. The major aim of the
research is to provide a safeguard against insider attacks and
improve attack detection accuracy by utilising collaborative
Snort node with blockchains certificates between control-plane
Ryu application and all Snort nodes signature database. We
deployed Ethereum Geth to create Ethereum environment in
Ubuntu 16.04 LTS, This environment enables to create genesis
block with major digital transaction signatures, we combined
and connected all transaction ID as a unique hash function.
Each Snort node utilizes this hash value and newly processed
transaction ID. Similarly, previous hash value and transaction
ID is to be used as a new hash value for the next Snort node
in the new block of the chain. However each Snort IDS node
in blockchain links with its previous block via hash values,
which results in a chain which is directly connected to unique
genesis block. This procedure provides secure communication
to all Snort IDS to accept rule-set from control-plane.
In VM-2, Ethereum Geth and Snort nodes were deployed,
each node constitutes secure SSH key pair to establish the
connection. We utilize python class for employing blockchain,
where SHA256 hash function is utilized for encryption.
The Fig. 2 depicts the blockchain network between col-
laborative CIDN nodes, where Snort-1, Snort-2 and Snort-3
node communicate each other by using a hash function such
as a public key and a private key pairs. In our proposed
CIDN network, Snort-1 node connects to Snort-2 node via
previous hash value, similarly, Snort-2 node connects to Snort-
3 node. In this way, every node of Snort invites each other
by the signed transaction. Moreover, after establishing secure
communication, these nodes start to share Snort rule-set with
each other with appropriate block key pairs.
TABLE I
SEVEN DIFFERENT ATTACK TYPES.
No Attack-types Description
1 DDoS-attacks DDoS Floods (Metaslploit)
2 SSH-attacks SSH Exploits (Metaslploit)
3 FTP-attacks Brute Force (Metaslploit)
4 HTTP-attacks HTTP Floods (Kali Linux)
5 ICMP-attacks Smurf Attacks (Metaslploit)
6 ARP-attacks ARP Spoofing (Kali Linux)
7 Scan-attacks Port Scans (Kali Linux)
The proposed system detects unknown DDoS, including
seven different types of attacks mentioned in TABLE I. This
system helps to keep protected from insider attackers. In SDN
architecture, IDS nodes are integrated with blockchain trusted
channel which enables SDN controller to effectively share sig-
natures rules to Snort nodes, which are implemented in data-
plane. Our design systematically operates as a loop of three
components such as Ryu controller, IDS nodes and blockchain
trust certificates, as depicted in Fig.1. The IDS depicts the
DDoS attack detection mechanism, data-plane represents the
network in which different Snort nodes are integrated by
blockchain to share signature automatically. However, SDN
Ryu controller plays a very vital role to manipulate and update
the blockchain hash table and all other Snort and OpenVswith
entries.
To evaluate this work, we carried out two different exper-
iments with three virtual machines, which are created with
Ubuntu LTS 16.04 64 bit OS. VM-1 machine is created with
SDN Ryu and Snort integration. SDN controller primarily
programmes the network operation such as updating Snort
signatures rules and data-plane flow. This programme is initi-
ated once Ryu receives the Packet in message from OpenFlow.
The Ryu controller changes the data-plane of proposed CIDN
network by utilising Link-A, in this virtual machine, Link-B is
used for Snort signature sharing towards CIDN network. VM-
2 machine represents the network domain, where a network
emulator (eg. Mininet) is utilised to create CIDN virtual
network with Mininet simulator. CIDN network comprises of
three Snort IDS nodes [23], all nodes were deployed with
default signature rules. When a new packet in arrives with
malicious attributes then main HIDS Snort node receives new
signature updates from Ryu via Link-D, then all other CIDN
nodes are also updated via blockchain. SDN based switches
use the OpenFlow protocol to communicate the VM-1 and
VM-2. Once all Snort nodes from CIDN receives packets, then
integrated switches use a port mirror approach for sending
entire traffic streams to Link-B. We carried two experiments
with CIDN with 100 Mbps data intensity to validate our
model performance. This machine also utilises NAT node as a
gateway so that some hosts can launch attacks as a malicious
injection. VM-3 is used for launching attacks towards CIDN-1
and CIDN-2 nodes. This virtual machine acts as a Host-Only
adapter.
Fig. 1. Proposed Test-Bed of Snort IDS with DNN Co-Detection in SDN.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed
system in SDN based environment, where we use CIDN net-
work to calculate the collaborative based Snort CIDN network
performance with the implementation of blockchain. In our
proposed model CIDN, uses blockchain based Snort nodes,
which can monitor, identify unknown malicious activity and
also share Snort signature rule-set with neighbouring nodes.
Each node needs to sign privately for qualifying rule-set,
each remaining node has to follow this rule-set. In this way,
blockchain nodes expanded when these nodes are verified then
these blocks receives the trusted rules only.
A. Attack modelling
VM-3 is used for attack modelling as a server, in which
we are running HTTP, FTP and SSH services. We utilised
the Metasploit framework and Kali Linux [24] in order to
generate seven types of malicious traffic as shown in TABLE
I. The purpose of using Metasploit framework is to generate
malicious traffic with different payloads and exploitation for
various operating systems such as Windows, Linux or Mac OS.
All seven major attacks along with legitimate traffic injected to
CIDN IDS nodes. All blockchain based IDS starts to inspect
malicious and legitimate traffic and trigger alarms if the input
traffic matches the rule set which is shared via blockchains
to Snort IDS. These number of alarms (comprises as false-
positive, false-negative and true-positive) will classify network
traffic.
B. Evaluation with malicious and legitimate traffic in CIDN
network
In this experiment, we investigated the performance of
collaborated Snort IDS with blockchain based CIDN network.
CIDN network is deployed to investigate performance between
malicious and legitimate traffic. We have utilised three col-
laborated Snort IDS nodes with blockchain, each node is also
integrated with SDN based switch. In this experiment, we have
launched seven different types of malicious attacks into CIDN
network, where each node is utilising Snort signature rule-set.
We utilised only 3 nodes in CIDN network, in order to measure
the CIDN detection accuracy we have utilised the following
IDS performance metrics.
1) True Positive (TP) - Values to correctly identifying as
attacks and non-attacks records.
2) True Negative (TN) - Values to correctly identifying only
non attack values.
3) False Positive (FP) - Values to incorrectly predicting
attack records.
4) False Negative (FN) - Values to incorrectly identifying
non attacks.
TPrate =
TP
TP + FN
(1)
FPrate =
FP
FP + TN
(2)
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Fig. 2. Blockchain trust communication inside CIDN Snort nodes.
FNrate =
FN
FN + TP
(3)
In CIDN, collaborated Snort IDS nodes were configured
with the default rule set. However, We run our proposed test-
bed for around two hours as shown in TABLE IV. The seven
different attack types were injected with different speed to
CIDN. In the first test, collaborated Snort IDS with default rule
set performance was not acceptable. This is due to the fact that
Snort is rule-based, it mainly focuses on rules set once input
traffic attack matches then Snort generate an alarm. In this
work, we are utilising seven attack combination with legitimate
traffic. Snort collaborated IDSs of CIDN with a default rule
set, only detected average combined TP rate 73.5% , 74%
and 76% for Snort-node-1, Snort-node-2 and Snort-node-3
respectively. In the second run time, we enable collaborated
IDS to receive rule set from Ryu controller by utilising trusted
blockchain. As shown in TABLE II , we have depicted the
three Snort collaborated nodes values, which are integrated
with blockchain rules set sharing approach. The Snort-node-
1 achieved average FP rate of 10% with six major attacks
types, in this node, Snort-FN rate was recorded nearly 6%.
In Snort-node-2 and Snort-node-3, ARP-attack, FTP-attack,
ICMP-attack and FTP-attack achieved average of 10% FP rate.
The average detection rate of true positive rate was calculated
around 97% for each of six malicious traffic with Snort-node-
1, Snort-node-2, Snort-node-3. However, Snort-node-1 only
achieved 44% TP rate, Snort-node-2 achieved 44% TP rate
and Snort-node-3 achieved less than 51% TP rate with Scan
malicious traffic.
Fig. 3 depicts the average performance of Snort IDS nodes
TP rate with respect to various traffic input intensity with
Mbps. The overall detection performance of the proposed test-
bed is evaluated with background running of the blockchain
mechanism, which enables each IDS node to adopt new
signatures from Ryu, which helps to detect more accurately
and effectively. When the proposed system processes the 10
Mbps of combined legitimate and malicious traffic, the average
TP detection rate of six attacks was stood more than 60%,
where SSH-attacks and Scan-attacks were recorded with 74%
of TP rate and 44% of TP rate respectively. Scan-attacks TP
rate was not good and overall it was recorded up to 50% of
TP rate. Average TP rate of DDoS-attacks,FTP-attacks, HTTP-
attacks, ICMP-attacks and ARP-attacks were recorded more
than 80% of TP between 30 Mbps to 60 Mbps traffic intensity.
Similarly, all of these six attacks types achieved more than
90% of TP rate with 70 Mbps to 100 Mbps combined input
traffic intensity. More ever, our proposed work achieved an
average of 96% of TP detection rate once we increase traffic
intensity up to 100Mbps, this detection accuracy was achieved
within six major common attacks types only detail is depicted
in Fig. 3.
C. Evaluation with legitimate traffic in CIDN network
In this experiment, we have utilised same CIDN network,
which also comprises the same three Snort IDS, these nodes
are collaborated with blockchain. To validate the proposed
design, we observed the collaborated Snort IDS performance
with the help of legitimate traffic. We generated legitimate traf-
fic by utilising (Ostinato tool). We performed an experiment
to investigate the performance of all collaborated Snort nodes
with a network speed of 100Mbps. We injected 1,250 bytes of
TCP, UDP and ICMP packets. As shown in Fig.1, we run Snort
IDS nodes individually on the proposed test-bed. In this CIDN
network, we have utilised a number of tools to record and
investigate CPU utilisation, memory/network utilisation, and
packet drop rate. The tools include dstat, Snort Barnyard2 log-
file, TCP-dump, nmap and Metasploit framework etc. In this
experiment, we manually injected packets with 300packets/sec
to all nodes. Background network link speed is divided into
the range of 1 to 100 Mbps. All collaborated Snort IDS were
investigated with total accumulated packets of 10,800,000 TCP
with 300 packets/sec intensity. Similarly, total accumulated
packets of 10,800,000 of UDP and total accumulated packets
of 10,800,000 of ICMP were also injected to CIDN network
nodes in order to validate. The TCP, UDP and ICMP packets
were manually injected with 300 packets/sec rate. The CPU-
utilisation and memory-utilisation of CIDN network with
blockchain based collaborated Snort IDS is depicted in the
TABLE III.
TABLE II
DIFFERENT ATTACKS DETECTION ACCURACY WITH BLOCKCHAIN BASED CIDN.
Malicious-traffic Snort-node-1 Snort-node-2 Snort-node-3
Snort-FP rate Snort-FN rate Snort-FP rate Snort-FN rate Snort-FP rate Snort-FN rate
SSH-attacks 9.0% 2.0% 8.0% 4.0% 11.0% 2.0%
DDoS/DoS-attacks 5.0% 4.0% 6.5% 2.0% 8.0% 4.0%
FTP-attacks 10.0% 7.0% 9.0% 8.0% 14.5% 4.0%
HTTP-attacks 4.0% 8.0% 6.0% 3.0% 8.0% 2.0%
ICMP-attacks 13.0% 4.0% 9.0% 6.0% 11.5% 4.0%
ARP-attacks 12.0% 5.0% 11.0% 9.0% 12.5% 3.0%
Scan-attacks 44.0% 19.0% 50.0% 17.0% 44.5% 21.0%
Fig. 3. CIDN network different attacks TP-rate with different traffic intensity.
The CPU utilisation of CIDN network with blockchain
based collaborated Snort IDS is calculated in such a way as
CIDN network contains three Snort IDSs nodes (eg Snort-
node-1, Snort-node-2 and Snort-node-3) each of that nodes
utilises shared processor unit, not overall CPU. The CPU
consumption of all three nodes is investigated with Intel (R)
Xeon (R) X5560 CPU with 2.88 GHz processor and 16 GB
RAM (DDR3 ECC-Registered Memory PC3-12800MHZ).
From the collected data, we observed that all collaborated
Snort IDS nodes were utilising almost the same CPU and
memory. Snort-node-1 memory and CPU utilisation were
almost identical with Snort-node-2 and Snort-node-3. From
the TABLE III, it can be seen that each node CPU-utilisation
is increasing due to the increment of input traffic intensity.
The average CPU-utilisation of Snort IDS node is 65% when
these nodes were receiving input traffic intensity 10 Mbps to
40 Mbps, then CPU exponentially increase nearly 80% CPU
utilisation in all three collaborated Snort nodes. Each Snort
node utilises only shared 2-cores CPU or 4-core CPU out of
8-core CPU.
In this experiment, each Snort node is able to classify nearly
2 Mbps out of 10 Mbps. With 20 Mbps and 30 Mbps input
traffic intensity, all three nodes were able to inspect only 4
Mbps traffic. When we injected 80 Mbps,90 Mbps and 100
Mbps traffic burst then Snort-node-1 only processed 11 Mbps,
Snort-node-2 only processed 13 Mbps and Snort-node-3 only
processed 10 Mbps respectively. These calculation were for
individual Snort IDS.
Moreover, Snort IDS is signature based and its processing
is limited if used as stand-alone IDS during heavy network
traffic burst. Once we inject 10 Mbps input traffic to CIDN
based network then all nodes with the help of blockchain can
easily process all input traffic. This enables CIDN network
to correctly identify intrusions with very less false triggers.
Blockchain based approach also helps Snort IDS to accept
new signatures from Ryu controller.
When input network traffic intensity started to increase,
the CPU and memory consumption also started to increase,
this results in packets drop as well. We injected almost total
accumulated packets of 10,800,000 for UDP, TCP and ICMP
with 300 packets/sec intensity. From TABLE IV, we can
observe that Snort IDS nodes with blockchain approach can
process 20,000 UDP, 21,000 TCP and 23,000 ICMP packets
with the 10 Mbps traffic intensity, TCP-packets drop rate was
higher at this stage such as 7.0%. Once we increase the input
traffic intensity up to 50% Mbps then the proposed CIDN test-
bed processed an average of 58,000 of UDP, TCP and ICMP
packets with the packet-drop rate of around 8%. We continued
to double up input network traffic such as the 100 Mbps
intensity of malicious and legitimate traffic then 63,000 of total
UDP, TCP and ICMP packets were processed with blockchain-
based IDS nodes, the packet drop rate was higher such as
21% of the total injected packets. Overall, we can observe
that after combining all Snort nodes, the packet processing
of the proposed system is feasibly improved to catch various
attacks types rapidly.
TABLE III
DIFFERENT CPU AND MEMORY UTILISATION WITH BLOCKCHAIN BASED CIDN.
Traffic-intensity Snort-node-1 Snort-node-2 Snort-node-3
CPU-utilisation Memory-utilisation CPU-utilisation Memory-utilisation CPU-utilisation Memory-utilisation
10 Mbps 64% 3.0 Mbps 61% 2.0 Mbps 60% 1.2 Mbps
20 Mbps 66% 3.5 Mbps 64% 3.3 Mbps 62% 3.0 Mbps
30 Mbps 67% 5 Mbps 65% 4.0 Mbps 65% 4.5 Mbps
40 Mbps 68% 6.6 Mbps 69% 6.0 Mbps 66% 6.0 Mbps
50 Mbps 71% 8.9 Mbps 70% 9.0 Mbps 69% 7.0 Mbps
60 Mbps 71% 9 Mbps 72% 9.1 Mbps 71% 8.1 Mbps
70 Mbps 74% 10 Mbps 74% 11.0 Mbps 72% 9.0 Mbps
80 Mbps 76.0% 10.9 Mbps 75% 12.0 Mbps 74% 9.11 Mbps
90 Mbps 77.0% 11 Mbps 76% 12. 2 Mbps 76% 10.0 Mbps
100 Mbps 81.0% 12.3 Mbps 78% 12.9 Mbps 77% 10.1 Mbps
TABLE IV
DIFFERENT PACKET-PROCESSING AND PACKET-DROPS WITH BLOCKCHAIN BASED CIDN.
Traffic-input UDP-packets TCP-packets ICMP-packets
Bandwidth time-elapsed Packet-processing packet-drops Packet-processing packet-drops Packet-processing packet-drops
10 Mbps 450 20,000 5.3% 21,000 7.0 % 23,000 1.2 %
20 Mbps 900 30,000 6.0 % 32,000 6.3 % 28,000 6.0 %
30 Mbps 1,350 40,000 6.8 % 40,000 4.0 % 34,000 5.5 %
40 Mbps 1,800 55,000 7.6 % 57,000 5.0 % 50,000 6.0 %
50 Mbps 2,250 58,000 8.4 % 56,000 9.0 % 58,000 8.0 %
60 Mbps 2,700 58,000 9 % 57,000 11.1 % 60,000 11.1 %
70 Mbps 3,150 61,000 11.5 % 62,000 12.0 % 60,000 9.0 %
80 Mbps 3,600 62,000 13.9 % 63,000 15.0 % 63,000 13.11 %
90 Mbps 4,050 63,000 15 % 60,000 19. 2 % 64,000 16.0 %
100 Mbps 4,500 65,000 17.3% 63,000 21.9 % 60,000 19.1 %
V. CONCLUSION
Collaborated intrusion detection approaches in SDN have
received much attention for providing an effective safeguard
against various malicious attacks in a larger network, which
enables various IDS nodes to mutually and effectively share
important information with each other such as, signature rules.
However, if any of the collaborated nodes are infected then
it shares untruthful Snort IDS signatures to all other IDS
nodes which degrade the CIDN network performance. From
the literature, blockchain technology is widely considered for
providing verifiable information sharing approach without us-
ing any complex trust-based mechanism. With the motivation
of current blockchain applications, our proposed work mainly
focuses to utilise Snort signature-based detection and deploy
SDN based test-bed in which we utilised three collaborated
Snort IDS, which securely receive new signature updates from
SDN Ryu controller. This collaborated approach of CIDN
network with Snort IDS generates very less false alerts such
as the average of 5% 0f FP rate and FN rate for DDoS
and HTTP attacks. However, the average FP rate and FN
rate for all other different attacks types were stood nearly
10%. Due to the fact that each collaborated IDS individually
detects burst attack input traffic. This way IDS nodes process
more packets as compared to stand alone IDS. In future work,
we will deploy SDN based application for building trusted
collaborated IDS framework via blockchain for scale-able
and distributed network, we will utilize a comprehensive and
effective mechanism with the unsupervised deep learning.
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